With the introduction by the Smith regime of harsh new security measures, virtually all the limited reforms introduced under the "internal settlement" agreement of 3 March 1978 have been reversed. The relevance of the steps that have been taken by the transitional government to lessen racial discrimination by opening white schools, hospitals and other facilities to Africans in the higher income brackets, in particular, must be assessed in the light of this continuing climate of political and military repression.
Approximately one half of Zimbabwe has been declared by the Smith regime to be under martial law following the announcement by Mr. Smith of measures "to facilitate the prosecution of our war effort, while at the same time leaving intact those civil authorities which are required to continue to play their part." Speaking in a nationwide TV and radio broadcast on 10 September, Mr. Smith said that martial law would be "introduced in particular areas as and when required. It will lead to tougher, stronger measures against our enemies." He warned neighbouring Zambia and Mozambique that they could expect further crossborder attacks and that they must "bear the consequences". The next step in the regime's offensive against the liberation movement, following the shooting down of a Viscount airliner by guerillas of ZAPU (Patriotic Front), would be to "liquidate the internal working of those organizations associated with terrorism" - a reference to the subsequent banning and mass arrests of officials and members of ZAPU and the People's Movement (ZANU).
Martial law was formally declared on 22 September in seven areas and extended to a further four areas on 3 October. The areas include white farm-land within 20 km of Salisbury, as well as a large number of Tribal Trust Lands and African Purchase Areas. A third Proclamation on 31 October extended martial law to a further 30 areas, including almost the entire south-western province of Matabeleland. Up to 3 million of Zimbabwe's 7 million people are now estimated to live in areas where the military has total power over the population.
Under the terms of the Proclamations, "the executive officers of the Government, the military forces and other security forces of the Government and its other Servants employed to assist the Government are... vested with full and complete powers and authority to do all things in their judgement proper and necessary for or towards the object of suppressing and dealing with... hostile actions and for restoring and maintaining good order and public safety" in martial law areas. While the Proclamation notes that the "existing provisions of the law in force in Rhodesia have proved inadequate", it is in many respects an attempt to legalise a situation already in existence on the ground i.e. one in which the regime's civil administration has broken down irretrievably in many parts of the country and where if any kind of central authority continues to operate, it is of a military kind.
The specific regulations are a further milepost in the Smith regime's disregard of the rule of law. In this, the Rhodesian Front has been joined by the three black members of the transitional government, Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Sithole and Chief Chirau, who according to Mr. Smith were 'willing partners' in the whole exercise. In particular, the regulations provide for the setting up of special courts martial consisting of "suitably qualified persons", with sweeping powers, (including the death sentence), to try offences connected with the armed struggle, and confer powers of indefinite detention without trial (previously the prerogative of the Minister of Justice, Law and Order) upon the security forces in martial law areas.
While the martial law regulations do indicate an even more ruthless and desperate phase in the regime's fight to preserve white minority rule, their precise strategic significance is somewhat obscure. In some areas, a declaration of martial law may conceal a decision by the Rhodesian military authorities to withdraw security force units from more outlying parts of the country where administrative control over the civilian population has deteriorated to such a point that they are no longer felt to be worth defending, in favour of concentrating troops around more economically important or strategically significant centres. If this is so, martial law is a tacit recognition of defeat on the part of the regime and that all other methods of flushing out guerillas and their supporters have failed.
COURTS MARTIAL The regulations governing the workings of special courts martial were published in the Government Gazette on 23 September.
(a) The courts will consist of "suitably qualified persons", unspecified, but presumably comprising nominees or representatives of the local military authorities. There is no proviso that the members must have legal qualifications or experience. (b) They will have jurisdiction to try any offence connected with the armed liberation struggle and the "maintenance or restoration of law and order" and committed within an area subject to martial law. (c) They may impose any sentence "which the court considers appropriate", up to the maximum which could have been imposed by the General Division of the High Court (i.e. the death penalty). (d) The death penalty, and certain other sentences (unspecified), will be subject to review by a Review Authority (whose composition is unspecified). A warrant signed by three or more members of a Review Authority shall confirm a death sentence and this will be carried out by hanging in any prison recognised as such in any part of the country (rather than exclusively in Salisbury Central Prison as in the past). In the case of other sentences, a warrant signed by the President of the court martial or any member of the Review Authority will be sufficient authority for implementation. Hangings will be carried out in secret in the usual way. (e) No appeal will be allowed to the civil courts against decisions or other proceedings of the special courts martial or the Review Authority. (f) Both the special courts martial and the Review Authority will be able to conduct their proceedings anywhere in Rhodesia (i.e. not necessarily inside a martial law area) and, if they wish, in camera. In other respects too, e.g. requiring a witness to appear before the court, the jurisdiction of the courts martial will extend outside the martial law areas. A warrant signed by the court President or any member of the Review Authority is sufficient authority to arrest and detain a person anywhere in the country in order to bring him or her to trial before the court martial. (g) "Legal representation of persons charged before special courts martial will be possible". No further details are given on this point.
These regulations, though considerably harsher, in many respects represent an extension of those governing the Special Courts set up by the regime in May 1976. The possibilities for adequate legal defence have been even further reduced and the powers of the military vis-a-vis the civilian judiciary drastically increased.
