Attacks by South African forces into Angola on 5 March — the date set by the UN Secretary-General for a response to his ceasefire proposals — represent the latest in a long series of violations of the northern Namibian border by the SADF. Information released by the Angolan authorities suggests that the raids were a deliberate attempt by South Africa to intimidate and provoke its independent African neighbour into withdrawing its cooperation from the UN negotiations on Namibia's future.
According to the South Africans, the raids were directed against SWAPO bases. They were prompted by military intelligence reports that SWAPO were moving their guerilla forces southwards from camps deep inside Angola, and had set up a number of new bases close to the Namibian border, preparatory to crossing into the territory in force as soon as the ceasefire was announced. This version of events is clearly calculated to bolster up the South African government's denial of the very essence of the Namibian guerilla war — namely, that by this stage, the bulk of the liberation movement's fighting forces are no longer inside Angola or indeed any neighbouring country, but are operating inside Namibia itself.
In fact, according to a detailed communique issued by the Angolan Defence Ministry, the attacks were exclusively directed against Angolan civilian targets.
First details of the raids were given by the SA Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Mr. P.W. Botha, in a parliamentary statement. An announcement by the Chief of the SADF on the same day, 6 March, stated that "elements of the South African Army and Air Force have attacked identified terrorist bases north of the South West African border". The SADF had been "compelled to launch the operation" because guerillas were "concentrated in bases near the border". On 7 March, military headquarters in Windhoek said that SA forces had suffered no casualties in the ground and air attacks against SWAPO bases. The SWA Commander, Maj-Gen Jannie Geldenhuvs, also stated that SA troops had encountered very little resistance and that a total of 12 bases had been destroyed in less than 60 hours. Quantities of large and small calibre weapons, documents, equipment and medical supplies had been taken. Some of the bases had simply been strafed by fighter aircraft, he said, others had also been attacked by soldiers, including members of the Ovambo battalion. (FT 7.3.79; BBC/GN 8.3.79, 13.3.79)
A communique from the General Staff HQ of the Angolan Ministry of Defence broadcast on Luanda radio on 10/11 March, however, gave a totally different picture. The communique revealed a wave of attacks on Angolan villages, on 5/6/7/8 March:
5 March - 6 Mirage 111 jets bombed Muandi village, wounding 2 people.
6 March - 2 Mirage 111 jets bombed Chitumbo and Muandi villages; 4 Mirage 111 jets bombed Namatopa and Kapembe; 7 aircraft, including 3 Mirages, together with 8 Puma helicopters, bombed and burned down the villages of Turi, Matimba and Domongo. The troops placed anti-personnel and anti-vehicle landmines on access roads. One person was killed.
7 March - 3 Mirages bombed Oshitumba and Cajiva; Mirages flew over Mapanda, Chitado, Kalueke and the city of Ondjiva.
8 March - 6 helicopters equipped with artillery bombed the villages of Chana, Angadima and Melonga, causing 5 dead and one wounded; a Mirage bombed Jofima village.
The communique added that all these places were in Kunene province. (BBC 13.3.79)
There is further evidence that South African jets may have been involved in the attack on 26 February on what the Rhodesian regime described as the main training camp in Angola for ZAPU (Patriotic Front) guerillas. According to communique issued by the Rhodesian Combined Operations Headquarters and other reports based on Smith regime sources, British-built Canberras and Hawker Hunters of the Rhodesian Air Force flew from Wankie air-base in north-western Rhodesia in the early hours of 26 February. They flew across Zambian airspace and into Angola to mount a bomb and rocket attack on a ZPRA camp at Villa da Boma, south of the regional capital of Luso. Combined Operations reported that the camp was 1300 km from Salisbury and that all the aircraft involved had returned safely to base. (Tel/FT 27.2.79; BBC 27/28.2.79)
If this account is accurate, this is the first time that the Smith regime has attacked targets inside Angola.
According to communiques issued by the Angolan authorities, however, the aircraft involved were five Mirage fighter jets, which bombed a Patriotic Front school and a Zimbabwean refugee camp at Boma, Moxico Province, abut 30 km from Luena. A total of 192 people were reported dead, including at least 14 Angolans, and over 500 wounded, who were taken to Luanda for treatment. (Ev.St./BBC 28.2.79; BBC 1.3.79)
The Smith regime is believed to possess Mirage fighter planes of its own — reports to this effect date back to at least the beginning of 1977. These aircraft have clearly been made available to it by South Africa and Rhodesian pilots are believed to have undergone training courses on the Mirages at bases in the Transvaal. (See "Smith's Settlement", IDAF Fact Paper No. 6). The further possibility remains that the attack on Boma actually originated in South Africa and involved South African pilots. Unconfirmed reports suggest that the aircraft flew from a base in the Transvaal, via Wankie, and returned to the Caprivi Strip in Namibia. While this remains speculation, the evidence that Mirages were used is a further pointer to South Africa's military collaboration with the Smith regime.
On 12 March the Zambian government revealed that 11 SA planes and helicopters had attacked villages and an army camp in the Sinjambele area of south-west Zambia, killing nine people and wounding 14. (FT 13.3.79)
