Information made available by the British and South African press during the closing stages of the Lancaster House talks has confirmed the crucial role that has been played over the years by South Africa in sustaining the military strength of the Rhodesian security forces — and hence the illegal regime itself. While the details that have been published in various newspapers of the numbers, disposition and role of South African troops and military personnel deployed inside Rhodesia contain some discrepancies, they make it clear that military intervention by Pretoria is on a far larger scale than was generally appreciated in the past — albeit obvious by implication to informed observers. The facts make it reasonable to assume that without South Africa's support, the Rhodesian military machine would long since have collapsed in the course of the guerilla war.
Despite clear undertakings given by the British government, no withdrawal of South African troops from Rhodesia had taken place — or even commenced — by the ceasefire starting date of 28 December 1979. On 7 January 1980, reports in the British press revealed that the British Governor, Lord Soames, had authorised the continued deployment of certain South African units inside Rhodesia, in contravention of what had been agreed at Lancaster House, although some other units appeared to have been withdrawn. Evidence previously published, moreover, indicated that there had been a fresh influx of South African military personnel, together with supplies of arms and equipment, while the Lancaster House talks were in progress and possibly even continuing since the arrival of Lord Soames on 12 December.
The situation has serious implications in view of recent threats by Mr. P.W. Botha and other South African spokesman that Pretoria is prepared to intervene militarily in Rhodesia in the event of a Patriotic Front election victory, and the Patriotic Front's own fears that the British government's ceasefire proposals fail to provide effective safeguards against a joint Rhodesian-South African military coup.
Most of the stories relating to South Africa's military presence in Rhodesia appeared in the British press in the week preceding 5 December 1979. On that day, the Patriotic Front delegation attending the Lancaster House talks accepted the British government's ceasefire proposals, on condition that various outstanding matters relating to their implementation were successfully resolved. This agreement, which was hailed as a breakthrough by Lord Carrington, rested on three specific assurances by the British government, namely: that the Rhodesian air-force would be kept in check and disarmed during the transitional period; that the Commonwealth ceasefire monitoring force would be of a sufficient size to do the job required of it; and that South African troops would be required to withdraw from Rhodesia prior to the arrival of the British Governor and the start of the ceasefire. This last has since been subject to varying interpretations in what appears to be an attempt by the British authorities to avoid the confrontation with Pretoria which would be necessary to effect its implementation. It was nevertheless clearly formulated by Lord Carrington at a plenary session held at Lancaster House on 5 December, and in subsequent statements to the British parliament by himself and Sir Ian Gilmour, the Foreign and Commonwealth spokesman in the House of Commons, to the effect that "there will be no external involvement in Rhodesia under the British Governor. The position has been made clear to all the governments concerned, including South Africa."
The Rhodesian and the South African security forces, following many years of South African military collaboration with the Smith regime, work closely together. Such debate as has been provoked on the issue in recent weeks has focussed on the deployment of identifiable South African troop units inside Rhodesia. In practice, South African support is much more comprehensive than this, involving substantial numbers of South African military personnel who are integrated into the Rhodesian security forces on an individual basis and who are formally under Rhodesian command; the provision of funds, training facilities, aircraft, armoured cars and other military equipment, arms and ammunition; South African participation in joint raids into the front line states; and collaboration at the highest levels of military intelligence and planning.
