MILITARY BUILD-UP
Information on the preparations made for Operation Protea by the SADF and SWATF inside Namibia, and the longer-term implications of the invasion for South Africa's military presence in the illegally occupied territory, is sparse (see PRESS CLAMP-DOWN). Nevertheless, it seems clear that the Operation required significant reinforcement of the 100,000 South African troops estimated to be present in Namibia (see FOCUS 34 p.1; see FACTS & FIGURES for Angolan government estimates of the number of SA troops deployed in Operation Protea).
Both SWAPO and the Angolan government concluded on the basis of the information available to them that South Africa's military presence in Namibia was substantially increased prior to and during Operation Protea. A communique to this effect issued by SWAPO from Luanda in mid-September also alleged that the SA troop contingent deployed during the Operation included "between 2,000 and 3,000 mercenaries from the Western countries of Europe, Israel and Latin America" (BBC 19.9.81).
In a press conference in Luanda on 4 September Sam Nujoma said that SWAPO had evidence that four fresh units of mechanised land and airborne troops had been flown into Namibia from South Africa in the course of the preceding week. The reinforcements had been stationed in Windhoek, two other towns in the interior of Namibia and at the three biggest South African military bases along the northern border. The SWAPO President also revealed that the Angolan invasion had been preceded by an "intense campaign" on the part of the SADF throughout the north of Namibia since early June, involving the burning of crops and the removal of the population into protected villages (GN/MS 5.9.81).
A journalist who visited Namibia during mid 1981 confirmed that in his view "the South African raid into Angola had been planned for a long time. Over the past 12 months, the South African troop concentration on the Angolan border has at least doubled. The attack took place towards the end of the dry season when armoured vehicles can drive straight across dry river beds, and the air force is not hindered by tropical thunderstorms. Locals were pointing out new army camps built in the last twelve months, when I visited the Namibian side of the border earlier this summer.... Inside the towns, which were surrounded with barbed wire, were new camps and police stations, often with the remnants of one or two mined vehicles stuck in the yard outside. In the public places were bomb shelters. Almost all the white homes had bomb-proof basements, designed to withstand mortar fire. These houses are new, and have been built for the recent influx of white administrators, soldiers and policemen" (Tribune 4.9.81).
In a letter sent to the UN Security Council in early August, Angola's Representative at the UN, Elisio de Figueiredo, said that South Africa had sent "an additional 40,000 armed men" into Namibia (Cit 5.8.81).
Maj-Gen Charles Lloyd, the Supreme Military Commander of South African forces, including the SWAFT, in Namibia, confirmed at a press conference a few days later that new military vehicles had been sent to northern Namibia. He maintained that they were to replace "old unserviceable vehicles" and said that reports about movements by heavy military vehicles in the north "did not indicate an invasion in any way" (DD 11.8.81).
Asked to comment, the SA Minister of Defence, Gen Magnus Malan, claimed that the presence of Cuban troops in Angola made it "imperative that we enhance our defence in South West Africa so that we will not be caught off guard if the situation there has to escalate due to the direct and aggressive participation by the MPLA and the Cubans" (ibid).
THE SOUTH AFRICAN VERSION
In a briefing for military correspondents in Oshakati, northern Namibia, on 28/29 August, the Officer Commanding Sector 10, Brigadier Rudolph Badenhorst, confirmed that Operation Protea constituted the biggest conventional operation by the SADF since "the beginning of the terrorist war". A four-pronged mechanized motorized attack had begun on Monday 24 August and the Angolan towns of Xangongo and Ngiva had been occupied. 450 "SWAPO terrorists and Angolan soldiers" had been killed for the loss of 10 members of the security forces. Brigadier Badenhorst maintained that the operation had been completed on 27 August but that "mopping-up operations" were continuing (BBC 31.8.81).
The Chief of the SADF, General Constand Viljoen, also stated on 28 August that SA forces had "completed their limited task in Angola and were now returning to their bases". He ridiculed the Angolan estimate of 45,000 South African forces in the border areas as "totally ludicrous as the troops had numbered not a fraction of this figure" (BBC 31.8.81).
On 14 September, 150 local and overseas journalists were briefed at Oshakati by Lt Gen. Jannie Geldenhuys, Chief of the SA Army and formerly Officer Commanding SWA. He stated that Operation Protea had ended on 4 September, when all SA forces had been withdrawn.
Gen. Geldenhuys stated that some 1,000 FAPLA and SWAPO troops had been "confirmed killed" in Operation Protea. Over 4,000 tons of war material and military equipment, valued at R200 million, had been captured by SA forces and either destroyed inside Angola or brought back to Namibia. The combined SWA/South African force, 41 per cent of which had been provided by the newly established SWA Territory Force (Namibia's "indigenous" army), had lost 10 men, an Alouette helicopter and an undisclosed number of armoured vehicles, he said.
Gen. Geldenhuys explained that two South African task forces had been deployed in Operation Protea. One had moved into SWAPO's "eastern sector" (east of Ngiva); the second task force entered Angola in two motorised columns using Ratel armoured personnel carriers, Buffel mine-protected carriers and Eland armoured cars. One column had moved north and west of Xangongo in the direction of Lubango, while the main force had concentrated on Ngiva, (WA 15.9.81; G/GN/Tel/ BBC 16.9.81).
SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGY
The main characteristics of the South African military military strategy, as perceived by the Angolan government, were outlined by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos at a press conference in Luanda on 9 September. He stated that the August invasion was "more ferocious than those carried out at various times against other countries of this area", and confirmed that, contrary to South African claims, it was directed against Angolan civilians and regular units of the Angolan forces, rather than SWAPO - a fact by this time generally conceded by the majority of overseas journalists present in Angola and witnesses to South African attacks. President dos Santos reminded the press corps that Angola was having to mobilise most of its financial and human resources for defence purposes, rather than channelling them productively into social and economic reconstruction. He appealed for material and financial assistance of all kinds from the international community, while pointing out that the only factor which made it possible for South Africa to successfully occupy parts of Angola was its air supremacy, due in particular to the shortage of trained pilots on the Angolan side.
President dos Santos reiterated the Angolan government's belief that South Africa's aim through Operation Protea was to leave parts of Angola's border regions in the hands of UNITA, while ostensibly withdrawing its own forces into Namibia (BBC 12.9.81).
OPERATION PROTEA: FACTS & FIGURES
[Facts and figures omitted]
