Any belief that the threat of apartheid aggression is reduced where the neighbouring state concerned is of 'moderate' political persuasion has been effectively demolished by the South African raid on Maseru on 9 December 1982. Lesotho's insistence that the refugees given asylum within its borders are forbidden under the terms of that asylum from involvement in any military activity did not save it from attack. Neither did the close integration of its economy with that of South Africa, nor its value to Pretoria as a source of migrant labour, water and natural resources.
The attack on Lesotho's capital, in which 42 people were massacred on the eve of Human Rights Day, was the first large-scale direct attack by the South African army on the former British Protectorates.
The raid was launched at about one a.m. on 9 December when five SADF helicopters dropped a force of an estimated 100 white soldiers into Maseru. The soldiers are believed to have been drawn from I Reconnaissance Commando, a special unit based in Durban and also responsible for the attack on ANC residences in Matola, Mozambique, in January 1981.
The South Africans, armed with intelligence which in retrospect was clearly out-of-date in a number of crucial respects, attacked and completely destroyed a series of 12 private houses. They were assisted, despite bright moonlight, by a battery of searchlights operating from the South African side of the Caledon River border. While their targets were members of the African National Congress, those found sleeping in the houses or who came within the line of fire out of curiosity, were indiscriminately shot. The attack lasted until 5.30 a.m.
According to the Chief of the SADF, General Constand Viljoen, the raid was a 'preemptive strike' against the ANC. The ANC, he alleged, was 'planning to carry out deeds of terror in South Africa, Transkei and Ciskei over the festive season'. Lesotho had been selected as a base for such raids due to its being 'strategically well-placed for the planning and co-ordination of terrorism'.
Following the raid, various South African government spokesmen warned that Lesotho would be attacked again as considered necessary. The Ambassador to London, for example, told journalists that his government was not fully satisfied by the results achieved in Maseru, and would repeat such a raid 'if the survival of lives depends upon it'.
The South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, also warning of further attacks, said he felt that Lesotho should compensate South Africa for damage caused by 'terrorists' rather than the reverse as demanded by the UN Security Council.
LEAD-UP TO THE RAID
The months and weeks leading up to the Maseru raid were punctuated by a series of increasingly acrimonious exchanges between the Lesotho and South African governments. They contained clear warning signs of Pretoria's readiness to attack. On a number of occasions, the Lesotho government reiterated its conviction that South Africa was — and remains — responsible for the training, equipping and direction of the dissident Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA). The actions mounted against Lesotho by the LLA showed a distinct progression from acts of sabotage against police and military units, power lines and communications, to include attacks on individuals and selective assassinations, both against Lesotho government officials and exiled members of the ANC.
REFUGEES
Immediately following the raid, Lesotho's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information reiterated his government's commitment to grant political asylum to refugees under the terms of international conventions.
There were a total of 11,500 South African refugees in Lesotho at the end of 1982, including members of the Pan Africanist Congress, the Unity Movement and black consciousness organisations as well as the ANC. Between 30 and 35 new refugees were reported to be entering the country each month. There are other refugees in Lesotho from Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique.
The Lesotho government's policy is to integrate the refugees into local society as quickly as possible rather than settling them in separate and isolated centres. As the death toll from the raid revealed, South African refugees and Lesotho nationals were living in Maseru as immediate neighbours.
The 42 people killed in the raid, either immediately or dying later in hospital, comprised 12 Lesotho nationals and 30 South Africans.
The majority of the South Africans had been granted political asylum by the Lesotho government. A number had arrived as refugees within the previous 12 months while others had lived in the country for several years.
EYE WITNESS ACCOUNTS
On first view the house on the corner looked fine. It was only on looking closer that I could see it was no more than a shell. The windows were smashed, the interior blackened and full of ash and chunks of burnt home. The skeleton of a car stood outside sunken into the ground. Five people had lived and died through timeless terror here...
I read in the press that 'terrorists' have been killed in Lesotho, their 'bases' destroyed. Friendly people, happy families with giggling children? Shacks and homes with tidy gardens? 'Children killed in crossfire' reports the paper. At 1.30 in the morning? 'The operation', it reads, 'has been a success'. Is this the way South Africa is working towards constructive change?
Mary Attard, volunteer working in Lesotho with International Voluntary Service on a mohair-weaving project.
Men, women and children alike were slaughtered. Among the critically injured was one woman six months pregnant who was shot in the abdomen... It is common knowledge that the majority of the victims were asleep when attacked and were either slaughtered in their beds or dragged outside and shot... the Basotho who were 'killed in the crossfire' were deliberately shot, because the invasion forces mistook their house for that of a South African refugee, entered and shot indiscriminately those they found.
Letter sent to the Canadian Department of External Affairs, signed by 19 Canadian doctors working in Lesotho for various relief agencies.
