The behaviour of the South African Air Force during its 23 May strafing raid on the Maputo suburb of Matola suggests that the South Africans met with more determined and damaging resistance from the ground than they had anticipated. The Mozambique Minister of Agriculture, in particular, contrasted their tactics with those of the South African commandos who, in January 1981, had encountered little opposition when they drove into Matola in trucks to attack a number of houses.
The 23 May attack, which began at 7.22 am local time, was carried out by eight South African Impala fighter bombers and six Mirage fighter jets. The South African Minister of Defence General Magnus Malan described the raid as a retaliatory attack following a car bomb explosion outside air force and military intelligence headquarters in Pretoria three days earlier (Friday 20 May).
The raid on Matola, launched at the height of Maputo's morning rush-hour, lasted only three minutes, due, in the Mozambican view, to prompt retaliatory fire from Mozambican anti-aircraft batteries and other defence units. Six people were killed and 40 injured, mainly by air-to-ground anti-personnel fragmentation rockets and machine gunfire.
According to General Malan the raid was directed at five African National Congress military 'bases', including two 'headquarters' responsible for directing guerilla actions in the Transvaal, a 'command post', a guerilla training centre and a 'logistical headquarters' and supply point. A missile site of the Mozambique Armed Forces which had 'provided protection' for the ANC installations, was also 'neutralised', the General said (WA 23.5.83). All these installations were apparently located amidst tree-lined residential suburbs and the predominantly industrial and trading centre of Matola.
The SADF maintained that 30 to 40 ANC guerillas had been stationed at each of the five bases and that 'scores' were killed in the attack (T 24.5.83).
According to the Mozambican authorities, the attacking squadron fired at least 120 rockets and thousands of rounds of machine gun ammunition at four main targets, namely:
- the Somopal jam and fruit juice factory in Matola, where three workers were killed – attacked by two Impalas. The factory creche was also strafed, but the children were outside at the time
- the Fomento and Liberdade residential areas – attacked by four Impalas
- the bridge over the Matola river, linking Maputo to the South African and Swaziland frontiers – bombarded by two Mirages which, after failing to hit the bridge, flew on to attack the electricity sub-station at Infulene. Two pylons were knocked down, causing local power cuts
- attempted attack on the Petromoc state-owned oil refinery by the remaining two Impalas, where the South Africans were forced back to a higher altitude by answering ground fire. The planes were also fired on by a garrison of the Mozambique Armed Forces (FPLM) stationed at the Radio Mozambique transmitters in Matola.
Foreign correspondents and diplomats who were taken on a tour of the affected areas by the Mozambique authorities tended to confirm this account of events. The British ambassador to Mozambique stated that he could only conclude that 'the targets hit are civilian' (ST (Lon) 28.5.83). Further evidence is provided by a video film of the area taken shortly after the attack and including interviews with survivors (IDAF film library).
The other four Mirages flew at a higher altitude to protect the rest of the squadron. At 7.25 am the planes left in a north westerly direction, heading for the Hoedspruit air base in the Transvaal, about 250 km from Matola. They had apparently approached from the south, possibly from a base in Natal (AIM reports 23-28.5.83; Noticias 24.5.83).
Tape recordings made by the control tower of the Maputo International Airport indicated that a formal 'warning' from the South Africans of the impending raid had actually been transmitted at 7.35 am, 10 minutes after the attack ended (GN 28.5.83).
Speaking to employees of the Somopal factory on 25 May, the Mozambican Minister of Agriculture, Sergio Vieira, pointed to the differences between the latest raid and the commando attack on Matola of January 1981. At that time, the raiders came in trucks and had entered and left Mozambique without meeting any resistance. In 1983, by contrast, the South Africans opted to attack from the air, and their planes 'could only fly over their target once. Everyone here, the army, the anti-aircraft batteries, the militia opened fire'.
The Minister added that the SAAF had really intended to destroy both the Somopal factory and the Matola river bridge, and to attack the Petromoc oil refinery and a cement factory, but had failed (AIM 25.5.83).
The air bombardment has been linked by the Mozambique government with attempts earlier this year to sabotage the opening of the Fourth Frelimo Congress in Maputo on 26 April. President Samora Machel told a mass rally in the capital's Independence Square on 21 May that 'the enemy' had sent spies into Mozambique to stir up division and discontent, and had intended to sabotage and blockade roads, bridges, airports and harbours to prevent delegates, guests and supplies from reaching the congress (BBC 24.5.83; AIM 25.5.83).
Prior to the congress, the Mozambique news agency AIM reported increasing cross-border infiltration by South African agents, coinciding with heavy troop movements on the South African side. A group of saboteurs in civilian clothing who infiltrated into Namaacha district on 19 April, were intercepted by the Mozambique defence forces. Their abandoned bags were found to contain equipment for making time bombs and forged documents and identity cards (AIM 24.4.83).
On 30 May, a South African aircraft was shot down by Mozambican anti-aircraft defence batteries when it flew low over the Moamba area of Maputo province, Machava, Catebe and Maputo bay, including the site of the previous week's raid. The aircraft fell into the sea and could not immediately be located. No survivors were found. The Mozambique authorities later reported that the plane was a pilotless reconnaissance plane, or drone, of a type manufactured in Durban under Israeli patent. It was equipped with a French-mode cine camera and had possibly been controlled by a second aircraft, defected following it inside Mozabican airspace but which turned away southwards after the drone was shot down. The South African newspaper Die Vaderland reported that the drone had belonged to South African military intelligence (BBC/GN 1.6.83; T 2.6.83; GN 36.83).
The period since South African aggression against Mozambique was last featured in FOCUS (No 39, March–April 1982) has seen an increasing number of border incursions, airspace violations and other open attacks by the South African armed forces, large scale sabotage of economic installations and transport links, and a sustained escalation in the activities of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) surrogate forces ('Chronology of South African aggression against the front line and neighbouring states 1982' IDAF March 1983, and Briefing, Paper No. 7 South African Aggression).
