The ultimate objective of Pretoria's aggressive military advance into Angola is becoming increasingly clear in the third year of South African Defence Force (SADF) occupation of the country's southern provinces.
Using the surrogate forces of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA organisation as a spearhead in its drive against military, economic and civilian targets inside Angole, South Africa seems set on forcing the Angolan government and the MPLA-Workers' Party to recognise UNITA as a credible political force. This would be the prelude to negotiations to include Savimbi in some kind of 'restructured government of national unity'. At worst, Pretoria's military offensive appears intended to topple the existing Angolan government from power completely.
The weeks leading up to the second anniversary of the 'Operation Protea' offensive of 23 August 1981, which led to the occupation of parts of Kunene Province, saw a further sharp escalation in South African aggression against Angola - a development predicted by Angolan government spokesmen on a number of occasions earlier in the year. Reports emanating from official Angolan sources indicated that South African military positions inside the occupied zone were being reinforced, the increased use of reconnaissance aircraft to pinpoint FAPLA (Angolan army) positions and movements, and a general advance northwards into Angola by South African regular troops, mercenary and UNITA forces acting in concert. These moves culminated in a concerted offensive against the strategically located town of Cangamba in Moxico Province, eastern Angola. Cangamba was effectively destroyed by the South African Air Force, supported by ground troops, on 14 August.
On 24 August, at a press briefing, the deputy Chief of Staff of the Angolan armed forces (FAPLA), Lt Col Ngongo, directly linked the upturn in South African military aggression against Angola with organisational changes in the structure of the South African state. He referred to the establishment of 'Intelligence Defence', a government body which he described as having responsibility for directing and co-ordinating all military operations against Angola, both by the SADF and by UNITA. Before Intelligence Defence came into being, Lt Col Ngongo said, co-ordination between the SADF and UNITA was at a relatively low level.
STRATEGY EXPLAINED: Pretoria's strategy against Angola was described by President José Eduardo dos Santos in a major speech delivered on 23 August 1983. Speaking in Luanda to members of the MPLA Central Committee and the government, and to military officials, the Angolan President explained that 'South Africa's armed intervention in Angola has long ceased to be retaliation for SWAPO activities'. Regular South African army units no longer mounted raids and ambushes against SWAPO from bases in Namibia, he pointed out. The prime objective of the South African offensive in Angola was now to force the leadership of the MPLA - Workers' Party to negotiate with UNITA. Pretoria pursued this objective, he continued, using a combination of propagandistic, political, diplomatic and military methods. 'Denigration campaigns' against Angola and the MPLA were being waged by South African radio and other information sources, through the international press and media. Inside Angola itself, Pretoria's basic weapons of destabilisation were its regular armed forces and their tool, UNITA. 'The UNITA puppet bands ... in fact act as a complement to the South African infantry forces and under their command, and are supported by their artillery and air force when need be', the President said.
ASSAULT ON CANGAMBA: The relationship between UNITA and the SADF was made particularly clear in the battle for Cangamba in Moxico Province, 450 km from the Namibian border and separated from it by the province of Kuando Kubango. Cangamba, the administrative centre for the municipality of the same name, is strategically placed on communication lines between eastern and western Angola. From late July until 8 August, according to the local FAPLA brigade command, the town was attacked by six enemy battalions of UNITA and South African special forces supported by South African heavy artillery units, totalling about 3,000 men. South African helicopters were used, for example on 3 August, to offload reinforcements, suspected by FAPLA to be mercenaries or 'South African strategists'. Guns and mortars, positioned about 10 km from the town, bombarded FAPLA units and civilians alike.
On 8 August, after a series of advances and retreats, the attackers were finally forced to withdraw, prompting substantially increased South African support action. On 10 August three South African 'tactical groups' entered Angola from the direction of Rundu in the Kavango area of Namibia. By 15 August they were massing in Kuando Kubango province south of Cangamba, in the localities of Caiundu, Vila Nova de Armada and Luenque. On 14 August, eight South African aircraft, four Canberras and four Impala Mk-2s, bombed and effectively destroyed Cangamba. The next day the town was occupied by heli-ported South African troops, moving in advance of the ground troops from the south.
At the same time, three more South African tactical groups were sent into the Mupa, Caluenge and Cuamako areas of the occupied zone of Kunene Province. South African military positions in the occupied towns of Xangongo, Evale and Ngiva were reinforced in the course of troop movements involving an estimated 10,000 men. Bombing and napalm raids were mounted against Mulondo and Kitee in the Kunene-Huila provincial border area.
FURTHER ATTACKS: Following the battle for Cangamba, the Angolan authorities warned that the South African offensive was continuing, with a view to occupying other parts of the country, possibly even further north. Fresh South African Air Force activity was also reported, including an increase in reconnaissance flights over town such as Cahama and Cuvelai, in central and north-central Angola. The Angolan deputy Chief of Staff stated on 24 August that large quantities of South African military hardware had been dropped to hostile forces operating north of the Benguela railway. Cargo vessels were also coming from Namibia, particularly at night, and offloading military hardware at points along the Angolan coast. On 18 August, SWAPO stated in Luanda that South African military positions inside Namibia, at Grootfontein, Rundu, Ondangwa, Oshivelo, Mpacha and Katima Mulilo, were also being reinforced.
