Discernible features of South Africa's programme of regional destabilization during 1983 have included:
- a sustained military offensive by South African regular forces in Angola * increased and more overt support for surrogate forces in Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique in particular * the use of economic and other pressures to influence government policies among the frontline and neighbouring states, particularly on the treatment of refugees and relations with the liberation movements. This has been particularly noticeable in Lesotho. * greater use of the regional and international media in a 'disinformation offensive' to project South African government thinking.
In Angola, Pretoria has been seeking to consolidate and extend its two-and-a-half-year-old occupation of parts of Kunene province; while stepping up attacks in the other southern provinces of Namibe and Kuando Kubango, and the central provinces of Moxico and Huila.
The offensive has been pushed forward by South African regular troops acting in close conjunction with UNITA and various mercenary and irregular forces. According to one Namibian-based analyst, a division of labour has emerged under which responsibility for aggressive, 'seek-and-destroy' missions inside Namibia is increasingly being taken by the police, particularly its specialist units such as Koevoet, while national servicemen are deployed on routine patrolling, guard duties and administration: 'It is now accepted', according to this source, 'that the major role played by the SADF is that of securing the southern regions of Angola, particularly Cunene and Cuando-Cubango provinces'.
South Africa's preparations for further advance into the central regions of Angola have included reinforcing its military bases in Kunene province and improving communication lines to facilitate the movements of troops and equipment through the occupied zone and beyond.
A marked increase in South African reconnaissance flights over central and north-central Angola was reported in the second half of 1983, together with a growing number of missions by land, air and sea to supply South African-controlled forces operating in the central region, along the Benguela railway and elsewhere.
SURROGATE FORCES
South Africa's strategy of using surrogate forces has also been clearly illustrated in Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
In Zimbabwe, court hearings and other incidents during 1983 provided further evidence of the training of Zimbabweans in South Africa for sabotage and other missions. The military camps referred to include Ntabeni camp near Louis Trichardt in the Transvaal, 'Spencer' and 'Gumbo'.
The Zimbabwean Minister of State with responsibility for security, Emmerson Mnangagwa, stated in September 1983 that some Zimbabweans were being trained in the Bophuthatswana bantustan. They were being infiltrated into Zimbabwe under the leadership of former white officers in Zimbabwe's own intelligence and security services.
Mnangagwa later gave journalists a list of names of SADF officers involved in training Zimbabwean recruits in South Africa. He said that such trainees were often sent to Namibia and deployed in Angola to gain combat experience.
REFUGEES
The precarious status of those South Africans and Namibians who have sought refuge in the front line and neighbouring states became sharply apparent in the aftermath of the Maseru raid and massacre of 9 December 1982.
Pressure has been exerted by Pretoria on the government of the host countries, to force them to impose restrictions on the refugees living within their borders, or even to expel them altogether.
The former protectorates of Lesotho and Swaziland have been particularly vulnerable to this kind of pressure. Immediately following the Maseru raid, a Swazi government statement warned that ANC members were in danger of attack 'from outside our borders'.
In Lesotho, the pattern of attacks on government installations and facilities, assassinations and sabotage by the South African-backed Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) continued throughout 1983. A new feature was the increasing use of economic blockades and other forms of harassment by South Africa.
Addressing the Lesotho parliament in April 1983, the Prime Minister, Dr Leabua Jonathan, listed these forms of attack as including: a campaign to discourage tourists from visiting Lesotho; harassment of Lesotho citizens at border posts and the restriction of entry to South Africa; the build-up of a network of agents inside Lesotho; and a blockade on the movement of goods through South Africa into Lesotho, including military equipment.
DISINFORMATION
South Africa has been making increasing use of its information services – both official and unofficial – in support of its destabilization strategy. Activity by clandestine radio stations broadcasting to Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe has been particularly noticeable.
Clandestine radio stations based in the Transvaal ('Radio Truth' and 'Voice of the Mozambique Resistance') and in Namibia ('Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel') have been consistently used throughout 1983 in support of South Africa's surrogate forces in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola respectively. By publicising the claims to military success and advance by UNITA and the MNR ('Mozambique National Resistance'), the stations serve to give greater credibility and importance to these forces. They have also broadcast commentaries on wider political events which reflect South African government thinking or seem calculated to stir up mutual suspicion and confusion among the front line and neighbouring states, to undermine the co-operation being achieved through the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) or to sour relations between independent Africa and the liberation movements.
It was to counter what was seen as Pretoria's disinformation offensive that the information ministers of the front line states met at Kadoma in Zimbabwe in July 1983 and agreed a programme of co-operation in the training of journalists, the attitude to South African-based correspondents wishing to visit the front line states and other matters (known as the 'Kadoma declaration').
