South African destabilization against Lesotho has taken a new turn since the beginning of the year, through attempts to influence the course of the country's general elections.

The government of Dr. Leabua Jonathan has also been coming under increasing pressure to sign a non-aggression pact with Pretoria, particularly since the announcement of the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique, and reports of a similar non-aggression pact having been signed with Swaziland two years previously.

The immediate objectives of the South African strategy are to increase the pressure on the African National Congress throughout the region and, by eliminating sources of material help and asylum, to make it as difficult as possible for refugees from apartheid to leave South Africa.

Steps were taken early in 1984 to dissolve the Lesotho interim national assembly to make way for the first general election in the country for 14 years.

Pretoria's interest in the proceedings was evident from an early stage. At the end of January, a Lesotho government spokesman said that the frequency of 'secret meetings' between senior South African officials and some opposition leaders in Lesotho had increased since the announcement of the general elections. The spokesman said that the meetings 'could only fuel the increasing belief' among the people of Lesotho that South Africa was 'handpicking individuals whom it would like to constitute an alternative government in Lesotho'.

The suspicions of many were confirmed when, on 29 February, the South African media announced the formation of an 'anti-communist' alliance to contest the Lesotho elections and pledged to strengthen links with South Africa in the event of victory. The 'Basotho Democratic Alliance' had reportedly been founded at a meeting in Pretoria on 6 January between the South African Foreign Minister and representatives of Lesotho opposition splinter groups and politicians.

Lesotho's Minister of Information later accused Pretoria of having promised direct intervention in Lesotho's affairs through military support to the Democratic Alliance, should it fail to win the elections, together with asylum for any Lesotho politicians who were displaced. In a note to Pik Botha, Desmond Sixishe accused him of having called on the Democratic Alliance 'to get the communities out of [Lesotho] because they are a security risk to South Africa'.

The Lesotho government's position, reiterated on numerous occasions during 1984, has been that a non-aggression pact is unnecessary since Lesotho represents no credible military threat to any other country.

The Lesotho Minister of Information and Broadcasting said in March that a liaison arrangement in force between South Africa and Lesotho since the latter's independence 19 years previously 'ensures that the two countries will not use their territories for subversive activities against each other'. A liaison committee met regularly to resolve problems and top security officials from both countries also consulted regularly.

Speaking in Parliament on 15 March, the Lesotho Prime Minister said that Pretoria's current emphasis on non-aggression pacts was intended to divert international attention from the apartheid system itself, the real cause of conflict in Southern Africa and the source of the refugee problem in the region. Non-aggression pacts with neighbouring countries would not stop black Namibians and South Africans fleeing from apartheid to become refugees, he stressed.

At the end of March, Lesotho reported that Basotho travellers were being subjected to harassment, humiliation and undignified treatment by South African police officials at the border posts.

Travellers were asked whom they intended to vote for in the Lesotho elections and those seeking medical and other services in South Africa were being turned back despite holding valid travel documents. Some were only being allowed to cross the border if they could produce letters of recommendation from the South African-based leaders of the Democratic Alliance.

There were renewed threats of tough economic action by South Africa.

The warnings were conveyed to the Lesotho Prime Minister in a letter and included the possible 'rethinking' of South Africa's participation in the Lesotho Highlands water scheme (due to provide all Lesotho's power requirements and to earn foreign exchange from the end of 1985). South Africa also threatened to curtail Basotho migrant labour by withdrawing work permits, throwing thousands of people out of work. Stopping the annual R4-million maize subsidy to Lesotho was also raised as a 'more remote possibility'.

The effects of the sustained regional drought, combined with economic recession, have made Lesotho even more vulnerable than usual to threats of this kind. A state of national food emergency was declared by the Lesotho Prime Minister on 4 April 1984 while unemployment had by that time already reached unprecedented proportions.

An SABC commentary on 19 April accused Lesotho of being 'obstructionist' and suggested that unless it joined the 'current peace initiative' in the region, its 140,000 migrant workers in South Africa might have to undergo 'strategic security checks' at border posts. This would 'reduce the traffic of people and goods to a fraction of what it is now'.

There was speculation that Pretoria would compensate for restrictions on Basotho labour in its mines by recruiting additional workers from Mozambique.

Economic pressures have also been used against Lesotho to force diplomatic recognition of South Africa's bantustans.

In March 1984, the Lesotho Foreign Minister warned that Lesotho might be forced out of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) (comprising Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and South Africa) and the Rand Monetary Union (Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa). One reason appeared to be South Africa's efforts, to date unsuccessful, to force its partners to accept the 'independent' bantustans into membership of these groupings. It was subsequently reported that South Africa was intending to press for unified administration of customs revenue among SACU members and the bantustans.

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