The governments of Botswana and Lesotho have been subjected to sustained pressure for several months in an attempt by South Africa to compel them to sign 'non-aggression pacts'.
South Africa's demands were pressed with particular intensity during May in the weeks preceding the visit to Europe of P.W. Botha, and again in September.
Draft proposals for 'security' or 'non-aggression' pacts were given to Botswana in March and to Lesotho in April, in each case after a number of discussions with South Africa (FT 23.3.84; DD 24.5.84). According to the South African Foreign Minister, by the end of May both Botswana and Lesotho were near to signing the agreements sought by South Africa. (BBC 25.5.84; DD 27.7.84). However, neither government did sign at that time. In August the government of Lesotho clarified its position in a telex to the South African Government, stating that the two governments were 'too far apart' for the proposed agreement to be signed (BBC 16.8.84). Botswana's position was underlined during the general election in September, when the President said that Botswana would not sign a non-aggression pact with South Africa (RDM 4.9.84).
Both governments stated that non-aggression pacts were unnecessary and inappropriate in the case of small and weak countries with no record of aggression against their powerful neighbour (BBC 2/12.5.84).
DEMANDS The treatment of political refugees was one of the most sensitive issues raised by South Africa. The proposals presented to Lesotho included a clause requiring Lesotho to notify Pretoria of every refugee entering Lesotho and providing for deportation or repatriation on South Africa's insistence. While no details were reported, it appears that Botswana received a similar demand (FOCUS 53 p.12; GN 26.5.84; FT 23.3.84).
Both governments rejected these demands, insisting that their existing policies prevented their territories being used by refugees as bases for attacks on South Africa. They affirmed their intention to continue receiving political refugees who complied with these policies (BBC 2.5.84; FT 23.3.84).
South Africa has also attempted to establish joint security structures which would give its armed forces access to information about refugees, if not access to the territories of Botswana and Lesotho.
Lesotho's refusal to agree to the setting up of a joint security or monitoring commission was described by South African radio as 'the main problem confronting South Africa' in its discussions with Lesotho. Lesotho has stated that there is already adequate machinery for co-operation with South Africa in relation to security (BBC 24.5.84).
South Africa's demands on Botswana were highlighted in the South African press in September, immediately after the President of Botswana had been returned to power with a large majority in the general election. A report in the Johannesburg Sunday Express referred to a recent increase in armed actions in South Africa against the Pretoria regime. It suggested that this might be related to what 'observers' believed was 'a new infiltration route through Botswana', and that it was likely to increase South Africa's pressure on Botswana. The report continued: 'It is believed that what South Africa wants is to be able to extend its counter insurgency arm across the border by entering into a joint monitoring commission with Botswana' (S. Exp. 9.9.84).
Responding to a statement the following week by the South African Foreign Minister alleging that armed attacks on South Africa were being launched from Botswana, the President's Office referred to its 'longstanding and well-known policy' of not allowing its territory to be used for such purposes (BBC 14/15.9.84).
PRESSURES The principal methods used by South Africa against Lesotho earlier in the year included: the formation of a political party (the Basotho Democratic Alliance) by South Africa to intervene in the forthcoming election in Lesotho on a platform of closer links with South Africa; threats to cut back the recruitment of migrant labour; and the withholding of customs revenue (FOCUS 53, p.12).
Threats by South Africa to withdraw from the R2000 billion Highlands water scheme have been repeatedly made during recent months. The scheme would provide much needed water for South Africa's industrial heartland, the Pretoria-Witwaterstrand-Vereeniging area, and would almost double the revenue of the Lesotho government (RDM 27.8.84).
In May South Africa gave Lesotho an ultimatum to sign a non-aggression pact by 28 May or face South Africa's withdrawal from the scheme. Shortly afterwards a joint South African - Lesotho delegation to Washington was cancelled when two of the South African had still not withdrawn from the scheme by September, it continued to threaten to do so, referring to Lesotho's 'unwillingness to meet South Africa's security needs' (RDM 29.4.84; 27.8.84; BBC 31.8.84).
In another development, it was revealed at the end of July that South Africa had held up consignments of light arms and spare parts from Britain (in some cases since October 1982) to be used by Lesotho's Paramilitary Force. Also held up was a helicopter from Italy, to be used for food relief (GN/FT/RDM 31.7.84; RDM 3.8.84; GN 8.8.84).
The methods used by South Africa to compel Botswana to sign a non-aggression pact have been less well publicised, but in recent months some details have emerged.
In May the President of Botswana stated during a visit to Washington that the South Africans had presented a draft of the agreement they wanted signed, and 'hinted strongly' that if Botswana refused, Pretoria might deploy troops along the border between the two countries and cause disruption to traffic (IHT 12.5.84).
In July the Botswana High Commissioner in London spoke of the 'tremendous economic, military and other forms of pressure' being experienced. He declined to give details but a press report stated that it was 'known that South Africa tried to prevent Botswana from going ahead with a new factory unless it signed an Nkomati style agreement'. The report cited other actions by South Africa: delaying renegotiation of the revenue-sharing formula of the Customs Union; cutting off water flowing into Botswana; delaying vital imports and exports passing through South Africa (GN 27.7.84).
RESISTANCE Both Lesotho and Botswana began in May to take steps to inform the international community and their own supporters more fully of the demands and pressures South Africa was bringing to bear, alerting them to the possibility that they might be forced to sign agreements, but also seeking support for their resistance.
The United Nations Secretary-General was briefed on the situation by Lesotho, as were friendly states and the OAU Liberation Committee (RDM 2.6.84; BBC 9/13.9.84).
Similar steps by Botswana included a visit by the President to Washington in May to inform the United States Government of its situation and to urge it to use its 'good offices' to intercede. Like Lesotho, Botswana complained to the OAU of South Africa's actions (Sta 14.5.84; GN 27.7.84; BBC 5.9.84).
