MPC ADMINISTRATION CONDEMNED

The South African government is establishing what it calls a 'transitional government' in Namibia, composed of six small parties in the Multi-Party Conference grouping. The development marks a clear break with the United Nations plan for Namibian independence (UN Resolution 435), which was provisionally accepted by Pretoria in 1979. The scheme, which is likely to further delay a settlement in Namibia and prolong the war, has been rejected by SWAPO, the United Nations, the Western 'Contact Group' and a wide range of Namibian organisations.

The present move is evidently a long-planned South African attempt to circumvent UN Resolution 435, which provides for a ceasefire between SWAPO and the South African Defence Force (SADF), United Nations-supervised elections and national independence over a period of several months. The South African government, which fears a SWAPO victory in such elections, has pursued a number of initiatives aimed at delaying, circumventing or modifying Resolution 435.

Since the mid-1970s, South Africa has concentrated — without success — on building a viable alternative to SWAPO. After calling a 'constitutional conference' in the Turnhalle Building in Windhoek, the South African occupation authorities held illegal and closely controlled elections in 1978, which were boy-cotted by SWAPO. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) was subsequently installed in a National Assembly with limited legislative powers which were subject to ratification by a South African Administrator-General. In July 1980, a 'cabinet' in the form of a Council of Ministers was established and a complex three-tier system of eleven separate administrations was instituted — one for each of the 'population groups' into which the Namibian population is divided by apartheid.

This structure, which remained under Pretoria's control through the Administrator-General, failed to introduce any significant changes in the apartheid system, and was characterised by internal wrangling and corruption.

MULTI-PARTY CONFERENCE

The Council of Ministers and the National Assembly were disbanded in January 1983 and the Administrator-General resumed direct control. Six months later, another attempt was made to establish a dispensation acceptable to Pretoria through a State Council, but this failed to attract even a modicum of support within Namibia. After months of secret negotiations, six small Namibian parties were persuaded to establish the Multi-Party Conference (MPC) in November 1983.

In February 1984 the MPC issued a Declaration of Intent, stating that it would draft a new constitution and lead Namibia to 'independence'. At talks held between SWAPO and the South African regime in Lusaka in March last year, the South African delegation attempted to present the MPC as a representative Namibian party with which SWAPO should negotiate, a factor contributing towards the swift breakdown of the conference. South African efforts to lend credibility to the MPC by obtaining the participation of SWAPO — or a section of SWAPO — failed. Instead the MPC suffered further defections when the Damara Council and a section of the SWANU party went over to the SWAPO delegation.

In January 1985 the Namibian weekly newspaper Namibia Nachrichten reported that two secret committees had been established a year previously to prepare a blueprint for an MPC government. The committees were composed respectively of leading figures from the private sector and top civil servants, many of them South Africans. The existence of the committees was confirmed, but the Administrator General, Dr Willie van Niekerk, denied that they had drawn up plans for a new administration. By the end of January, however, MPC spokesmen were making it clear that a 'transitional administration' would soon be established 'within Resolution 435 or without'.

At the end of March, an MPC delegation met with President Botha and key members of the South African State Security Council in Cape Town. Following this meeting, a detailed plan for the establishment of a 'transitional government' was released by the MPC, officially in the form of a 'request' to President Botha.

The plan was publicly approved by Botha on 18 April. A draft proclamation was prepared in May to enable the MPC administration to be installed in Windhoek on 17 June.

The MPC administration will consist of an eight member executive authority or 'cabinet', a 62-member legislative authority and a 20 strong constitutional council chaired by a judge. All the positions on the three bodies have been allocated proportionately to the six parties making up the MPC — the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), the Labour Party, National Party, Rehoboth Liberated Democratic Party, a faction of the South West African National Union (SWANU) and SWAPO Democrats (a small party unrelated to SWAPO). Estimates of the combined following of these parties vary from 70,000 to 82,000 persons, a tiny minority of Namibia's estimated 1.4 million people.

The executive and legislative authorities will assume the powers previously invested in the South African Administrator-General, except for the vital portfolios of Defence and Foreign Affairs. All legislative changes will still have to be ratified by the Administrator-General, or a similar South African appointee.

The administration is thought to be likely to take a number of steps in an attempt to establish its credibility — for example, taking over the headquarters of the Administration for Whites in Windhoek and possibly agreeing to refer to the country as Namibia instead of the official 'SWA/Namibia'. It is reported to be deeply divided over more fundamental issues, such as the repeal of Proclamation AG8 which established the elaborate system of multi-tier administrations.

The Constitutional Council has been charged with drawing up a constitution for 'independence'. Preliminary work on the constitution began at a conference in Bonn, in the Federal Republic of Germany. Under the sponsorship of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, ten MPC members met lawyers to work out the basis of a constitutional proposal.

The Constitutional Council is expected to complete its work in 12 to 18 months, after which the 'independence constitution' will be submitted to a 'national referendum' in which the Namibian people will probably be required to cast a straight 'yes' or 'no' vote. The plan is to push Namibia through an independence process under South African control during the next two years.

LACK OF SUPPORT

The South African plan has been strongly condemned both in Namibia and internationally as a further manoeuvre by Pretoria to maintain its illegal occupation of Namibia and resist the implementation of Resolution 435. The UN Security Council has declared the establishment of the interim government to be 'null and void' and stated that it should be reversed. The governments of Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Canada and the USA — which made up the Western 'Contact Group' on Namibia — have also declared the move to be void.

Noting that 'the MPC has no democratic electoral mandate nor support from the Namibian people', the Namibian Council of Churches said that the interim government would 'only prolong suffering and bloodshed amongst our people, and economic destruction'. It reiterated its position that Resolution 435 'remains the only basis for a peaceful solution'.

A protest rally in Katatura, outside Windhoek, was organised by SWAPO and a number of other Namibian political parties. More than 2,000 people at the rally declared their 'unequivocal opposition' to the interim government.

SWAPO said in a statement issued in Lusaka that the interim government was 'intended to buy time and hopefully enable South Africa's puppets to gain credibility by appearing to be in charge of the state machinery in Namibia'.

In May, control over the Koevoet counterinsurgency police unit and the Security Police was transferred to the authority of the Commissioner of Police in Namibia. However, Pretoria's continued control of defence affairs will ensure that the SADF and its related occupation structures will remain the power base of the MPC administration. The transfer of Koevoet, which is responsible for most of the fighting against SWAPO, is little more than cosmetic. The 'SWA Police', like the 'SWA Territory Force', remains firmly under the control of its South African counterpart, and the SADF retains direct operational command over all military and police activities.

By relinquishing formal control over Koevoet — which will be technically disbanded and renamed — the military authorities have relieved themselves of official responsibility for a unit which has gained an international notoriety for widespread atrocities.

Pretoria has also transferred some economic responsibilities to its Namibian structures. Most of the Namibian assets of the South African Transport Services (SATS), including the railway network, were transferred in May, and the assets of the Water and Electricity Commission (SWAWEC) were due to follow soon. Control of the oil concessions for a gas field off the Namibian coast was also handed over. South Africa retains direct economic control over facilities in the Walvis Bay enclave, which is administered as part of the Cape Province and claimed as a South African possession.

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