In September, the South African Defence Force (SADF) carried out large-scale operations in Angola and prepared for a further escalation of the war in order to prevent the collapse of its surrogate force, UNITA.

At the end of August, the SADF penetrated 10 km into Angolan territory, claiming that its activities were directed solely against SWAPO. Two weeks later, on 16 September, a large force of South African troops swept into Angola. According to official SADF statements, the troops, who numbered 500, split into small 'reaction teams' and conducted 'follow-up' operations against SWAPO guerillas. Admitting that the Air Force had also been deployed, the SADF said that an air attack had been launched on a 'SWAPO forward command post' at Nehone in southern Angola. By 19 September, the SADF was claiming that its forces were being withdrawn, a process which was said to have been completed by 22 September. According to the SADF, the operation, which had been restricted to the area near Nehone about 100 km into Angola, had led to the killing of 15 SWAPO guerillas and the capture of 49. All the SADF troops had returned safely to base.

It soon became clear, however, that the South African operation was far larger than officially admitted and that it was aimed primarily at defending UNITA against an Angolan government offensive which threatened to push the movement out of its positions in Cuando Cubango and Moxico provinces.

Since the middle of 1983, Angolan government forces have been engaged in a large counter-offensive against UNITA. At the end of 1983, a heavily armed SADF mechanised force advanced on Angolan positions in Cunene Province with the aim of regaining the initiative for UNITA and extending the area in the south under South Africa occupation. This operation proved a failure. The Lusaka Agreement signed shortly afterwards led to a situation where the SADF was politically constrained from mounting further large-scale operations into Angola. Denied the same level of South African support as in previous years, UNITA continued to suffer setbacks throughout 1984. Although it was able to carry out some operations further north than before, in the Lunda provinces, it was gradually pushed out of the central areas towards Angola's eastern borders. In January 1985 the Angolan news agency, ANGOP, stated that UNITA had collapsed and that it was breaking apart.

At the end of July 1985, the Angolan forces launched a large offensive against remaining UNITA strongholds in the south east, attacking bandit positions around the towns of Cazombo and Mavinga, which had been destroyed in previous UNITA actions. Thousands of UNITA bandits were killed, and it was reported that the main UNITA base at Jamba, near the Namibian border, was threatened.

Alarmed at the prospect of UNITA being defeated in its remaining strongholds, the SADF despatched a mechanised unit equipped with rockets, artillery and armoured cars to support UNITA in the Mavinga and Cazombo areas, 190 km into Angola. Angolan army positions were bombed by a force of 18 Canberra and Mirage jet aircraft, but this did not prevent the Angolan armed forces from recapturing Cazombo and driving UNITA back from Mavinga. The elite 32 Buffalo Battalion, a special SADF force based in northern Namibia and consisting mostly of Angolan mercenaries, was also reported to have been deployed with UNITA in the battle for Mavinga and Cazombo.

An extensive air supply operation was implemented to equip UNITA forces with more heavy weaponry and supplies, and constant flights of SA Air Force aircraft from Namibian air bases were reported.

Throughout this period, the SADF continued to claim that its operations in Angola were restricted to the extreme south and were aimed only at SWAPO. This claim was undermined when a South African soldier serving with UNITA as a medical orderly was killed at Cazombo and his body taken to Luanda. Forced to admit that the SADF was backing UNITA, Defence Minister General Magnus Malan declared that South African assistance was limited to 'humanitarian and moral' aid. General Malan's statement marked the first time in the ten year campaign of destabilisation against Angola that the South African authorities have admitted to having any connection with UNITA.

Describing the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi as a man who 'stands for the same norms and values in which we believe', General Malan also said that 'humanitarian' aid to UNITA might have to be extended in the near future, 'Military intervention cannot be excluded', he said in an interview with the Afrikaans newspaper Beeld. General Malan's statements were widely regarded as part of a campaign to prepare the South African public for a further escalation of the war in Angola, and an open commitment to fighting with UNITA.

Jonas Savimbi, who was interviewed on South African radio on 24 September, also indicated that the conflict would be intensified, saying that 'semi-conventional war was developing'. He indicated that he expected that 'South Africa would expand its aid programme if UNITA should find itself losing the war, because if this happened South Africa would lose an important ally in Angola'.

The crisis in Angola, with the threat of the virtual destruction of UNITA, came at a time when Pretoria was facing unprecedented international isolation and when its relations with the United States were the coolest for many years. A large scale South African invasion would have carried the risk of further isolating the regime. The incursion which began on 16 September led to almost immediate condemnation from the United Nations Security Council, while a senior official in the United States administration said that 'No previous facts were brought to our attention that would warrant such an action'.

Furthermore, the Angolan invasion coincided with an announcement by the South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, that Pretoria had violated the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique.

In preparation for an escalation of SADF activities in Angola, two senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were despatched to Washington for talks with the Reagan administration. They were reported to be seeking either United States backing for a South African invasion, or direct US military aid to UNITA. In July, the United States Congress lifted a ban on US aid to UNITA, causing the Angolan government to break off all diplomatic contacts with the Reagan administration. A commentary on the official South African radio made it clear that the South African regime expected the United States to give Pretoria backing for an invasion. It warned that even if such backing was not forthcoming, the apartheid regime would be obliged to act in support of its UNITA surrogates.

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