south africa
EMERGENCY GRIP TIGHTENED
On 28 November last year the South African government tightened its five month old State of Emergency. A new order gave powers to commissioners of police to ban any gatherings. These powers had until then been reserved to magistrates. The action underlined the government's intention of using the emergency to try to bring about a fundamental shift in the balance of political forces in South Africa.
Until the new order was promulgated the banning of meetings involved a procedure which required the signing of an order by a magistrate, unless the meeting was being organised in an area or by an organisation listed in a specific order under the emergency regulations.
The new order, which could affect any gathering, indoor or outdoor, supplemented existing restrictions. These included an eleven-year ban on outdoor political gatherings held without official permission and earlier emergency regulations which prohibited many organisations from holding meetings. Like the declaration of the State of Emergency itself on 12 June, this step was taken in the context of widespread political mobilisation and popular resistance to apartheid.
Government spokesmen have attempted to portray the situation in June last year as one which justified the imposition of a State of Emergency. In a statement to Parliament on 12 June President Botha alleged that government intelligence reports indicated that the ANC, UDF and others 'were planning large-scale unrest ... during the period 16 to 18 June 1986 which would commence with demonstrations and marches to main centres'. More recently in October this theme was repeated at a press briefing by an official of the government's Bureau for Information. He said that the 'unrest situation' had escalated to such an extent prior to 12 June 'that we had moved possibly into a pre-revolutionary phase'. He went on to say that had the State of Emergency not been declared 'we would possibly have seen a fully -fledged revolution'. (Debates 12.6.86; BBC 3.10.86)
The regime's objectives in imposing the emergency were further defined by President Botha in his statement to Parliament when he described the establishment and spread of 'alternative structures' which were undermining government institutions. Statements like these made it clear that the government aimed not only to suppress protests, but to halt and reverse the advances in political mobilisation since 1976 which had opened up a field of legal extra-parliamentary political struggle. (See ORGANISATIONS UNITE)
They help explain the pattern of repressive action under the State of Emergency – mass detentions of activists and members of community and youth organisations, restrictions on released activists, bans on organisations holding meetings and prohibitions on residents of townships displaying emblems or colours of listed organisations. The measures have been directed at every level of organisation and in every locality, with community and youth organisations being particularly hard hit. (IDAF Briefing Paper No.21; see also CHILDREN IN DETENTION)
In attempting to justify its actions the government has tried to present the mass protests of the past two years as the effect of a small and unrepresentative body of 'radicals'. Stating that the majority of people in South Africa were 'moderate' in their political aspirations, government spokesmen have claimed that their policies enjoy widespread support.
A further indication of government thinking was given in an interview in October by the Defence Minister Magnus Malan, a senior member of the State Security Council.
In the interview General Malan said: 'There is only a limited section [of the black population] that is really interested in political participation. I think that for the masses in South Africa, democracy is not a relevant factor. For them the issue is the satisfaction of their own needs. Their needs change from time to time and are exploited by revolutionaries.'
Later, reacting to speculation about Western attempts to open channels of negotiation between the government and the ANC, Malan declared that negotiations were not a solution. He indicated that continued military action against neighbouring states was a key aspect of government policy and that the clampdown would continue on 'revolutionary activities' inside South Africa, both the armed struggle and 'political agitation'. (FM 3.10.86)
SECRET NETWORK DIRECTING EMERGENCY
In October the South African Weekly Mail revealed details of a military-dominated system of secret committees responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the SADF, police and various government departments under the State of Emergency.
The basic structures of this network, known as the National Security Management System (NSMS), were documented in Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine, published by IDAF in May 1986. The NSMS was established in 1979 as part of the South African regime's 'total strategy' initiative, which stressed the need to harness all the powers of the state in a co-ordinated effort to preserve white minority domination and destroy the liberation movement. While the basic structures of the system were known, no concrete information was forthcoming to confirm its assumed role in directing local efforts to repress resistance. (See FOCUS 66, p.2)
At the pinnacle of the NSMS lies the State Security Council (SSC), which is believed to have taken the decisions to impose the 1985 and 1986 States of Emergency. The SSC has largely replaced the cabinet as the seat of executive and strategic decision-making for the South African regime. Under the chairmanship of P W Botha, it consists of senior cabinet ministers, the heads of the SADF, SA Police and other senior government and military or police personnel. The SSC is serviced by a permanent secretariat, reportedly composed mainly of military and intelligence personnel. Its policies are implemented at a national level by a Work Committee which draws together the heads of government departments. Thirteen interdepartmental committees falling under the SSC co-ordinate the activities of government departments in various fields, ranging from culture to telecommunications. (Brutal Force, pp.34-7)
At a regional level the NSMS is implemented through Joint Management Centres (JMCs), of which there are at least ten, established at SADF Territorial Command headquarters. Most of the JMCs and the bodies falling under them are chaired by local military or police commanders. Directly beneath the JMCs lie 60 sub-JMCs, and underneath them mini-JMCs which work at the level of local authorities. The names of 348 of these were listed in the press. (WM 8.10.86)
In this way, the whole of the country is blanketed by the NSMS. The JMCs do not have their own budgets or employees—their function is to co-ordinate the SADF, police and government departments at a local level, and to draw up joint strategic plans. Their work is handled by three committees, of which the most impor-tant is the Joint Intelligence Committee. This committee monitors local conditions, identifies potential areas of conflict, and assesses information on local community and political organisations and leaders. The Political, Economic and Social Committee of the JMC is responsible for dealing with problems such as rents and township services in order to prevent these becoming grievances. The Communications Committee is responsible for propaganda through the press, radio or pamphlets. These committees are also thought to be behind the widespread distribution in townships of false leaflets purporting to come from various political groups. (WM 8.10.86)
The JMCs, operating under the overall direction of the SSC and its related structures, have played a crucial role during the States of Emergency. According to General Geldenhuys, Chief of the SADF, sub and mini-JMCs are specifically set up in response to 'unrest' developing in specific areas. Detailed information on their co-ordination of local initiatives is only available in a few cases, as for example, in Cape Town where the JMC initiated a strategy to counter the influence of a residents' association in the Atlantis township. (WM 8.10.86, 14.11.86)
In August, a document was obtained by the press which set out comprehensive plans in-volving the Johannesburg JMC to break rent boycotts in the townships of the Vaal Triangle. These included the formation of local 'collection action groups' composed of police and various officials, the eviction of non-paying tenants, the use of computers to build information banks and the recruitment of youths for 'weekend camps' where they would be encouraged to convince their parents to pay rents.(See FOCUS 67, p.2)
The SADF and the Department of Education and Training have for several years been running a variety of youth camps aimed at 'winning the hearts and minds' of black youngsters, many of which have been kept secret. In September it was discovered that young detainees held under the emergency regulations were being offered release on condition they attended 14-day courses at one of the centres where youth camps are held. The authorities at first refused to disclose any details of the camps, but one of them was later briefly opened to the press. There were accusations that the scheme was initiated by the JMCs as part of the co-ordinated effort to undercut resistance.(GN 15.9.86; DN 19.9.86; WM 28.9.86)
