Between August and November more than 3,000 South African troops invaded Angola, in the largest operation since the occupation of Cunene province in 1981. Simultaneously, South Africa was rearming the MNR destabilisation force in Mozambique, a bomb was planted in Zimbabwe allegedly by South African agents and renewed threats were made against Botswana. Meeting in Angola in November the leaders of the Front-Line States accused Pretoria of creating a 'climate of war' throughout the region which was 'aimed at frustrating the efforts of the international community to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the sub-region'.

The fighting in Angola took place mainly in Cunene and Cuando Cubango provinces which lie immediately north of the Namibian border. Much of southern Cunene has been devastated and parts have been occupied by South African troops. Between June and August the South African Defence Force (SADF) attempted to consolidate its domination of the province. Angolan military positions and small towns such as Xangongo and Cahama were bombed and attacked by SADF columns. A South African attempt to seize Ngiva, the destroyed provincial capital, failed in the middle of July, but by the first week of August considerable SADF reinforcements had been brought in.

While fighting continued in Cunene, during September and October the focus of SADF operations shifted east to Cuando Cubango province, where Angolan government forces were pushing back UNITA. Operating from Cuito Cuanavale, Angolan troops crossed the Lomba river in the first week of September and inflicted heavy casualties on UNITA forces in the area. The aim of the operation, according to the FAPLA Chief of Staff, Lt-General Antonio Franca dos Santos, was to cut UNITA supply routes and destroy underground stores in the Lomba river vicinity.

To counter these operations SADF mechanised columns and 32 'Buffalo' battalion were brought into Cuando Cubango province, engaging FAPLA in the Cuito Cuanavale area on 5 September. Clashes took place throughout September, both in Cuando Cubango and Cunene, where another attack on Ngiva took place. The Buffalo battalion is believed to have borne much of the brunt of this fighting, suffering many casualties which the SADF later admitted were not reported.

With its ground forces meeting strong resistance, the SADF turned mainly to artillery bombardments and bombing raids during October. Long-range G-5 artillery was used to bombard Angolan positions along the Lomba river. Between 9 and 20 October South African aircraft carried out at least eight bombing raids on military and civilian targets over a wide area of southern Angola. FAPLA reported suffering heavy casualties during artillery bombardments, but several South African aircraft were brought down by Angolan anti-aircraft fire. Ground fighting and aerial attacks continued on a smaller scale in November. Thousands of troops from the SADF's 8th Armoured Division were moved into areas of Namibia bordering Cunene province, pointing to South African preparations for a larger-scale invasion.

For much of the period of fighting the SADF denied that it was involved in Angola except for 'limited' operations which it said were aimed at SWAPO. In one clash early in November the SADF claimed to have killed 150 SWAPO combatants at an undisclosed location in Angola for the loss of 11 of its own troops. This was denied by SWAPO and the Angolan authorities.

On 11 November the head of the SADF, General Geldenhuys, admitted for the first time that South African troops were fighting alongside UNITA against the Angolan armed forces. He claimed that the South Africans were also fighting 'Russian and Cuban forces', but this was refuted by the Angolan authorities. The head of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, contradicted South African claims and said that his forces were fighting alone.

LOSSES The official revelations of South African involvement after previous denials, and a rising toll of white casualties, led to unusually strong criticism of the SADF from amongst the white population in South Africa. At least one Afrikaans newspaper joined the English-language press in calling for more information about the war. To counter criticisms, the authorities claimed that Angolan forces had been forced to retreat after only 'limited assistance' to UNITA from the SADF. It was also revealed that President Botha and senior cabinet ministers had secretly visited troops in occupied Angola.

By mid-November the SADF had admitted to 23 deaths and 42 wounded, but Angolan estimates were that more than 230 invading troops had been killed. The Angolans also stated that they had destroyed at least 11 South African armoured cars and 24 Casspir vehicles, as well as at least 16 aircraft including Mirage and Impala jets. The South African Air Force denied many of these losses, but it was generally acknowledged that some aircraft had been lost during the October bombing raids.

It is difficult, if not impossible, for South Africa to replace jet fighter aircraft because of the United Nations arms embargo, and its ageing Mirages are inferior to the Angolan Migs now in service. In past invasions, the SADF has relied on air superiority, carrying out devastating bombing attacks when it has been unable to advance on the ground. South African generals have expressed deep concern at their inability to crack Angolan air defences.

TROOPS MUTINY SADF losses were compounded by problems of morale, and at least two units involved in the fighting mutinied.

Up to 400 troops were reported to have deserted or resigned from 101 Battalion, a Namibian-manned professional unit in the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF). Many of the troops were said to have been imprisoned after refusing to fight in Angola. One of the soldiers who refused to fight said that 101 Battalion troops had been used as 'UNITA mercenaries' and had been issued with UNITA weapons before being sent into Angola. He accused the SADF of being 'cowardly' for using black Namibian troops in front-line fighting while white South Africans remained behind. After initially denying the reports, SWATF headquarters later admitted that 24 soldiers from 101 Battalion had been discharged for refusing to obey orders. A further 48 had been dismissed from another SWATF unit, 202 Battalion.

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