South African-controlled Koevoet counter-insurgency police were implicated in widespread intimidation during the election campaign. Koevoet was supposedly confined to base at the end of August, but intimidation and killings of SWAPO leaders continued.
In terms of the UN independence plan, all police combat units and South African military personnel should have been withdrawn or demobilised and their command structures dismantled by 1 July, except for 1,500 troops restricted to base. But Koevoet units, who formed the cutting edge of the South African military machine, were integrated into the regular police. The South African Administrator-General refused UN requests to demobilise Koevoet and on 14 July he ordered police patrols in northern Namibia to be stepped up, claiming that South African intelligence sources had detected a force of nearly 2,000 SWAPO combatants in Angola massing on the border. UN investigations revealed that there was no evidence of this. Nevertheless, police combat patrols continued, leading to an increase in violent attacks.
An observer mission from the Non-Aligned Movement concluded in mid-August that at least 1,000 South African officers and troops remained in Namibia, forming a command structure 'under the cover of providing administrative support to the demobilised South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF) personnel'. SWATF troops were retained on full pay during the election period. The mission described the demobilisation as 'superficial'.
The South African Defence Force also retained, at least until the end of August, a sophisticated signals and intelligence monitoring system in northern Namibia. This relayed information to the militarised enclave of Walvis Bay, where more than 6,000 troops were stationed, including a complete mechanised brigade withdrawn from the north.
Pressure from the UN Security Council finally led to an announcement by the Administrator-General on 15 August that Koevoet units would be 'confined to base where they will undergo reorientation and retraining'. However, he stated that only 1,200 personnel were involved whereas previously the police commander had said there were 3,000 Koevoet personnel. It was not clear for what purpose Koevoet would be retrained.
Continuing UN concern at 'reports of widespread intimidation and harassment of the civilian population,' was reflected in Security Council Resolution 640, adopted on 29 August. This demanded 'the disbandment of all paramilitary and ethnic forces and commando units, in particular Koevoet, as well as dismantling of their command structures'. It called for a review of the strength of UN military and police forces in Namibia.
Until mid-August, reports of police assaulting and intimidating people in northern Namibia persisted. Investigations into such incidents were conducted by the police themselves and UN forces only monitored investigations. Victims were reported to be frightened to report assaults. Nevertheless, over 100 cases involving the police were being investigated by mid-August. Many victims have instituted civil claims through the independent Legal Assistance Centre set up in July 1988. In its first year, the centre instituted 236 claims against the police and army, but in August, with many of the claims pending, the South African authorities attempted to prohibit the centre's attorneys appearing in court. However, the objection was thrown out by the Supreme Court.
Many assaults were ascribed to ex-members of SWATF units and police in civilian clothes. Cases escalated in the second half of August, and there were widespread reports of intimidation by armed bands consisting of ex-soldiers or police loyal to the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). All the northern bantustans were affected, particularly the Eastern Caprivi, Kavango and Ovambo. Although the violence was perpetrated by men openly carrying weapons and moving around in quite large groups, few were arrested or brought before the courts.
Much of the violence was directed at intimidating SWAPO election campaigners. In late August the UN regional director, John Rwambuya, commented that conditions for free and fair elections were 'a very, very long way off'.
Violence also spread south and there were several clashes and attacks near Windhoek in late August and early September.
Despite numerous assassination threats against SWAPO leaders, the UN Representative in Namibia refused to provide protection, saying it was a South African police responsibility.
On 1 August Petrus JOSEPH, a former SWAPO combatant who had been captured and forced to join Koevoet, but who had since rejoined SWAPO and was playing a prominent role in its election campaign in Rundu, was killed by police who ambushed him in his home. He had obtained a court order in March restraining police and soldiers from harassing him, after repeated threats.
Another prominent SWAPO supporter in northern Namibia, Kondjashili NDIP-WASHIMWE, narrowly escaped death when five men attacked his home on the night of 18 August firing shots and throwing a hand-grenade. A SWAPO community leader, Simon David HANSE, was killed by police during a confrontation between police and a crowd of residents in Leonardville in southern Namibia.
Anton LUBOWSKI, a prominent lawyer who was a SWAPO politburo member and deputy head of administration at SWAPO's election directorate, was shot dead outside his home in Windhoek on 12 September. His assassination, which came only two days before the return to Namibia of SWAPO President Sam Nujoma, led to renewed international demands for the UN to improve security before the elections.
