The transition to independence in Namibia is taking place in the shadow of a South African military threat. Pretoria is in a position to resume the war in Namibia at any stage in the independence process — indeed, a week before the election the authorities were preparing to unleash fighting units.
South Africa's principal counter-insurgency unit in Namibia, Koevoet, remained a major component of the police for most of the election process, and was only demobilised on 9 October. Even then, ex-members of the unit remained in the South West Africa Police (SWAPOL), which, in terms of the UN plan, was responsible for maintaining law and order during the election process, under the supervision of the UN police, CIVPOL.
Koevoet was supposed to be disbanded in December 1988, but the unit became part of SWAPOL and killed hundreds of SWAPO combatants and civilians after the breakdown of the ceasefire on 1 April 1989. In May the authorities again claimed that Koevoet had been disbanded, but two-thirds of its 3,000 members were absorbed into SWAPOL. Koevoet police continued to patrol northern Namibia in armoured vehicles on which heavy machine guns were mounted, in violation of the UN plan.
After considerable pressure from the UN, on 28 September the South African Administrator-General announced that 1,200 members of the unit would be demobilised — he did not account for the remaining 800 members in SWAPOL service, or another 1,000 who had ostensibly been stood down earlier. The following day 930 men were hastily assembled at Oshakati in northern Namibia and demobilised. The UN stated that it was not satisfied with the process, and another formal demobilisation, at which 1,000 Koevoet were present, took place on 9 October.
The demobilised Koevoet — who continued to be paid by SWAPOL — staged demonstrations in Rundu in the Kavango region, harassing SWAPO members and openly parading with weapons. They were also responsible for violent incidents in Oshakati and Ongwediva, directed at both SWAPO and UNTAG.
At the end of October, the South African authorities announced that 2,000 new members would be recruited into SWAPOL, which claims a strength of 6,000. An invitation was explicitly extended to ex-Koevoet members to join. Despite objections from the UN Special Representative, Martti Ahtisaari, who said that he had not been consulted, the recruitment drive went ahead.
Guns
The South African authorities have refused to disclose the number of weapons in 'private' hands in Namibia — but press reports indicate that 120,000 gun licences have been issued, each of which can cover up to ten firearms. This implies that one out of every ten Namibians is armed — most of the arms are believed to be owned by whites or by demobilised members of the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF). In addition, many are believed to hold weapons illegally. SWAPOL commander General Dreyer admitted, for example, that in the first weeks of April he had 'opened the armoury ... anyone could take guns, there was no counting'.
There's an awful lot of guns, rockets, flares and grenades going off. The Koevoet people are extremely angry. And they are turning their hostility against their traditional enemy, SWAPO, and now against UNTAG.
Senior UNTAG official quoted in Weekly Mail 13.10.89
On 1 April, according to figures provided by the South African authorities and the UN, over 6,000 mainly white members of part-time local Commandos or Area Force Units, 5,000 Citizen Force members (also mostly white part-timers) and 9,000 full-time black SWATF troops were stood down. The full-time forces continued to receive full pay until 1 November.
The UN plan called for the units to hand in their weapons to UNTAG for safe-keeping at drill halls, but the six full-time battalions handed over only 1,349 small arms. It was claimed that the other weapons were the property of the South African Defence Force and had been taken back to South Africa. However, UNTAG monitors said that most of the 9,000 men had been granted gun licences just before demobilisation and had been allowed to purchase SADF weapons at a nominal price. A secretive organisation run by ex-SADF officials, the Ombili Foundation, was reportedly involved in co-ordinating the activities of ex-soldiers.
In October police handed out automatic weapons to whites in rural areas on the grounds that they are police reservists. Whites in Tsumeb and other northern towns were also called to meetings organised by the paramilitary Civil Defence authorities, who issued detailed instructions for 'dealing with violence'.
Military structures
The UN plan called for the withdrawal to South Africa of all but 1,500 SADF troops, who would be allowed to remain at bases at Grootfontein and Oshivello. As Walvis Bay was not covered by the plan, the estimated 3,000 South African troops there would be unaffected. An extensive signals monitoring facility was initially retained, but this was dismantled at the end of August at the insistence of the UN.
South African troops were not entirely withdrawn. In a report to the Security Council on 6 October, the UN Secretary-General disclosed that 159 SADF personnel were staffing a newly-established Department of Defence Administration which was responsible for paying demobilised troops. Approximately 500 other personnel were running airfields in the north, over 200 were providing medical services and 72 were working in other posts. Furthermore, over 1,300 soldiers of 203 and 207 Battalions in the Kavango region had not been demobilised, on the grounds that they would have no other means of livelihood if sent away from their bases. Together with their families, these soldiers, derogatively classified by the South Africans as 'Bushmen', made up a community of 8,000. Members of the units were reported to be involved with UNITA operations in southern Angola.
In October and November, most of the remaining SADF personnel were withdrawn to South Africa. However, many were relocated to Walvis Bay, where there is also a naval facility and an air base. In July the SADF announced that it was spending R37 million on upgrading facilities there, including building a new permanent military base which will accommodate 1,500 personnel at Rooikop on the perimeter of the South African-claimed area.
Destabilisation
Pretoria has waged a widespread war of destabilisation against its neighbours, making use of forces recruited from within those countries. South African control of Walvis Bay gives it a stranglehold over Namibia and a launching pad for military operations in the heart of Namibia. Apart from the tens of thousands of armed ex-soldiers and police from which an internal force could be created, the SADF has longstanding links with UNITA, SWATF officers have been integrated into the SADF, and control of SWAPOL will continue to be effectively exercised from Pretoria until Namibia becomes independent.
The SADF has kept intact its top fighting unit in Namibia, 32 Battalion, and relocated it in the north-western Cape where it has easy access to the Namibian border. A new military town with 5,000 inhabitants has been established at a disused mine at Pomfret to house battalion members and their families. Ten trains and four aircraft were involved in shifting the 15,000 tons of military equipment belonging to the battalion, which was continuously involved in operations in Angola and northern Namibia after 1975, many of them of a covert nature.
